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Does Market Misvaluation Help Explain Share Market Long-Run 
Underperformance Following a Seasoned Equity Issue? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relation between pre-SEO announcement date misvaluation and long-run 
post-SEO performance for a large sample of Australian seasoned equity offerings (SEO) 
made between 1993 and 2001. Our study is motivated by inconsistent findings across 
countries with respect to the SEO long-run underperformance anomaly first documented in 
the US, inconclusive findings with respect to the hypothesis that managers exploit market 
misvaluation when timing equity issues, and a recent Australian Stock Exchange proposal to 
loosen SEO regulation.  We find SEO firms underperform common share market benchmarks 
for up to five years after the announcement. Using a residual income valuation method, we 
show this underperformance is related to pre-announcement date misvaluation. An 
unexpected result is that underperformance and misvaluation are more severe for private 
placements than rights issues. Institutional factors unique to the Australian setting, 
particularly the large number of smaller loss-making firms among private placement issuers, 
appear to explain the poorer performance of placement firms. Our results are robust to 
various measurement methods and assumptions, and demonstrate the importance of 
researching SEO performance in alternative institutional settings.  
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1. Introduction 
We study three aspects of the investment performance of Australian firms that make 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). First, we examine whether SEO firms underperform 
market benchmarks for holding periods up to five years following the SEO announcement 
date. Second, we investigate whether subsequent performance can be explained by market 
misvaluation prior to the SEO announcement date. Third, we analyse long-run performance 
and misvaluation across SEO type (rights issues and private placements).  
Our study is motivated by three factors. First, the SEO underperformance anomaly found 
in the US (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995) has not been fully 
explored in Australia. Normally that might not be of great interest because the share markets 
are similar; however, the anomaly we study is not robust across countries (Abhyankar and 
Ho, 2002). Second, various theories have been proposed to explain SEO firms’ long-run 
underperformance, such as the ‘windows of opportunity’ hypothesis, namely that managers 
of issuing firms take advantage of market misvaluation that occurs from time to time. 
Hitherto, tests of the misvaluation hypothesis have utilised the level of issue overpricing to 
measure misvaluation (Ritter, 1991; Allen and Soucik, 1999a), with inconsistent results. We 
use a different measure; one based on the residual income value. Third, from a practitioner’s 
perspective, there is some merit in empirical studies that offer insights into how capital 
markets operate under changing circumstances. When considering the level of equity issues 
fluctuates substantially over time, the structural changes to the new issues market brought 
about by the 1994 amendments to the Corporations Law,1 and recent attempts to loosen 
capital raising rules (ASX, 2003), further Australian research seems warranted.  
                                                 
1 Most Australian firms now opt to raise new equity via private placements instead of rights or public issues. 
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Based on information and signalling theories, long-run underperformance is predicted to 
occur in the Australian SEO market, and to be related to pre-announcement day misvaluation. 
Long-run underperformance and misvaluation are expected to be less severe for private 
placement issuers than for rights issuers because investors in placement issues are likely to 
have better access to private information about the SEO firm. We test our hypotheses for a 
large sample of SEOs made between 1993 and 2001 by applying a residual income model to 
measure misvaluation. As predicted, SEO firms do underperform common benchmarks for up 
to five years after the announcement date and underperformance is related to announcement 
day misvaluation. However, contrary to expectation, misvaluation and underperformance are 
more severe for private placement issuers. Institutional factors unique to the Australian 
setting, particularly the large number of small loss-making firms among private placement 
issuers, appear to explain the poorer performance of placement firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
SEO underperformance literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 explains the 
data, sample and research design. Section 5 presents results from univariate and multivariate 
tests. Section 6 outlines results of robustness tests and the paper concludes in Section 7 with a 
discussion and summary of findings.  
2. Prior Literature  
2.1 Evidence on SEO long-run underperformance 
Anomalous returns to equity offerings were noted in the 1960s (Friend and Longstreet, 
1967) and have been studied closely since the 1980s (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986). Early studies focused on relatively short-term share price performance, but in 
the 1990s attention shifted to longer periods. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) were among the first to show returns to US firms following SEOs 
were significantly lower than their non-issuing counterparts for up to five years. Studies in 
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other countries have often reported similar findings.2  Some evidence of the anomaly is also 
evident in Australian SEOs. Based on a sample of 102 Australian SEOs between 1983 to 
1994, Allen and Soucik (1999a; 1999b) find these firms underperform (by 124%) benchmark 
firms matched on size and industry over five after the issue.  
2.2 Explanations for SEO long-run underperformance 
Reasons given for the long-run underperformance anomaly include delayed investor 
reactions to signalling, managers exploiting windows of opportunity, earnings management, 
and outright rejection of the anomaly on the grounds of experimental error.  
From a signalling perspective, an SEO financing decision is likely to convey a negative 
signal because if proceeds are used to retire debt, the decision will signal an increase in the 
firm’s underlying risk (Masulis, 1983), or if proceeds are used to fund capital expenditures, 
the decision will signal existing assets generate insufficient funds to finance ongoing 
investment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). While the negative signal conveyed by an SEO 
announcement can help explain a short-term price decline (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; 
Masulis and Korwar, 1986), it is not clear how, in efficient markets, it can explain long-run 
underperformance. 
The windows of opportunity rationale is a behavioural explanation. A “window of 
opportunity” arises when there is sufficient information asymmetry between management and 
outside investors regarding the firm’s true value. During windows in which the market has 
overpriced the firm’s shares, managers can exploit their information advantage by issuing 
shares at inflated prices (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Brav, Geczy and Gompers, 2000). Over 
certain periods, windows of opportunity may be so pervasive that the market as a whole is 
overly optimistic in its expectation of the future performance of equity-issuing firms. This 
                                                 
2 For example, long-run underperformance is observed following SEOs issued in the UK (Levis, 1995; Suzuki, 
2000), Japan (Cai and Loughran, 1998; Kang, Kim and Stulz, 1999; Mathew, 2002), Hong Kong (Mathew, 
2002), Germany (Stehle, Ehrdardt, and Przyborowsky, 2000),  France (Jeanneret, 2000), Spain (Pastor and 
Martin, 2001; Llorca and Sala, 2003), and Switzerland (Dubois and Jeanneret, 2000). 
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over-optimism can obscure an SEO’s negative signal to such an extent that price does not 
decline in the short-run (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), 
Loughran and Ritter (1997), and Jindra (2000) provide empirical evidence in support of the 
windows of opportunity hypothesis.  
The earnings management perspective suggests managers actively deceive the market by 
managing earnings upwards before an SEO. The market is subsequently surprised when 
future performance reflects unmanaged earnings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1997; Rangan, 
1998). Teoh et al. (1997) show discretionary accruals, which proxy for earnings management, 
in the year before the offering year are directly related to the issuer’s subsequent stock 
performance over four years following the offering.3  However, in a more recent study, 
Shivakumar (2000) argues earnings management is not designed to mislead investors but 
reflects the issuer’s rational response to anticipated market behaviour when the offer is 
announced. In contrast to prior studies, Shivakumar finds earnings management per se does 
not explain the anomaly.  
Experimental error in the measurement of risk and return has been suggested as another 
explanation. Lee (1997) argues that if managers of SEO firms have an information advantage 
they would rationally trade their shares in anticipation of underperformance. Since he finds 
the volume of insider trading is unrelated to the long-run stock return of SEO firms, he 
concludes long-run underperformance is not induced by information asymmetry, but results 
from risk mis-measurement. Others claim inconsistent findings are due to differences in 
abnormal return measurement (Shivakumar, 2000; Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2000). Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000) show the SEO anomaly disappears when the calendar-time abnormal 
return (CTAR) method is used to measure returns. Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) find US 
firms making SEOs between 1972 and 1992 underperform a matched-firm benchmark, but 
                                                 
3 Elder and Zhou (2003) observe discretionary accruals from three years before to three years after the SEO are 
lower where the auditor is a Big 5 firm or an industry specialist. 
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not a benchmark measured according to a more broadly based (four factor) asset pricing 
model. Similarly, Cheng (2003) and Li and Zhao (2003) use a propensity score matching 
procedure and find no evidence of long-run underperformance.  
2.3 The association between overvaluation and long-run underperformance 
Research design issues aside, most explanations for SEO long-run underperformance stem 
from a belief that investors overvalue an SEO firm’s equity prior to the issue. Despite this 
belief, only a few studies (e.g., Ritter, 1991 and Schaeffer, 2003) have directly tested for any 
link between overvaluation on the offer date and subsequent long-run underperformance. 
Typically these studies measure mispricing by the relative difference between the closing 
stock price on the offer date and the offer price itself. We are unaware of any published study 
that has utilised a fundamental valuation method to explain the SEO long-run 
underperformance anomaly.  
Since Ball and Brown (1968), the information content literature shows accounting 
numbers used in fundamental valuations explain a significant part of contemporaneous and 
future stock return. The Residual Income Model (RIM) has become popular as a fundamental 
valuation method, largely as a result of Ohlson’s theoretical work (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham 
and Ohlson, 1995). RIM has been shown to predict stock returns better than price-earnings 
multiples, book-to-price ratios, or discounted cash flow methods (Penman and Sougiannis, 
1998; Frankel and Lee, 1998; Lee, Myers and Swaminathan, 1999; Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan, 1999; Ali, Hwang and Trombley, 2003; Curtis and Fargher, 2003). RIM’s superior 
predictive ability is often attributed to its lower sensitivity to input measurement error and 
assumptions inherent in other valuation models (Penman, 2001).  
The comparative advantages of RIM have stimulated interest in utilising RIM to measure 
misvaluation. D’Mello and Shroff (2000) use RIM to show managers repurchase stock when 
their assessment of the firm’s economic value exceeds market value. Dong et al. (2003) 
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report the residual-income-value-to-price (RIV/P) ratio helps explain long-run 
underperformance experienced by bidder firms in takeover situations better than the book-to-
price ratio. In the SEO context, Jindra (2000) examines the relation between overvaluation, 
measured by the difference between the current market price and an earnings-based value, 
and the probability a firm will issue new equity. Using a residual income value and a 
dynamic earnings approach to measure earnings-based value, he demonstrates both 
approaches are powerful in explaining announcement period returns. However, Jindra does 
not examine the relation between market misvaluation and the SEO firms’ long-run 
performance.  
3. Hypotheses  
3.1 Long-run underperformance of Australian SEO firms 
Although there are exceptions, most international studies report an underperformance 
anomaly. Institutional differences can cause differences to be observed across countries. In 
the UK, a pre-emptive right given to existing shareholders leads to rights issues being more 
common than in the US. This difference may partly explain the lower level of reported 
negative abnormal returns following a UK SEO (Abhyankar and Ho, 2003; Levis, 1995). 
Although Australian rules on pre-emptive rights are similar to the UK, Australia has a much 
smaller capital market and relatively smaller firms. Since Loughran and Ritter (1995) show 
negative long-run underperformance is more pronounced among smaller firms, we would 
expect to observe significant long-run underperformance in the Australian context. The early 
Australian evidence of Allen and Soucik (1999a; 1999b) appears to support these findings. 
Thus our first hypothesis is:  
H1a: Australian firms that announce an SEO subsequently experience share price 
underperformance in the long-run. 
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As previously indicated, differences in the nature and regulation of equity issues may also 
impact on the extent of underperformance.  Since the Australian Corporations Law 
amendments of 1994, a prospectus has not been required for a private placement but one is 
still required for a (public) rights issue. Private placements have become an attractive method 
of raising capital because they allow firms to obtain capital relatively cheaply and quickly.4  
In addition, a private placement could be preferred to a rights issue because of lower 
proprietary costs. A firm making a rights issue may have to make specific public disclosures 
about its future growth plans or its intellectual property in order to attract enough investors to 
subscribe to the issue. In contrast, a private placement issuer can avoid detailed public 
disclosures.  
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) argue private placements signal undervaluation, as the 
willingness of private investors to take up a sizeable stake in the firm is likely to credibly 
convey undervaluation to the stock market. Uninformed investors assume that private 
investors are exploiting an information advantage about the prospects of the SEO firm.5 Thus, 
assuming other issuer characteristics remain constant across issue type, the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors should be lower for private 
placements, leading to relative superior performance.  Although we are unaware of any 
Australian evidence on the relative long-run performance of the two types of SEO, Denhert 
(1992; 1994) shows placement firms tend to outperform rights issuing firms in a narrow 
window surrounding the SEO announcement date.6 Assuming these findings can be 
generalised to long-term performance, we hypothesise the following:  
                                                 
4 In 1993, 47% of SEOs in our sample were placements but after 1994 the percentage increased to more than 
80% of total issues. 
5 Although Australian continuous disclosure rules prohibit the selective release of inside information, carve-out 
provisions and enforcement difficulties can result in private information being exchanged ahead of a public 
release.  
6Denhert (1992) finds a significant negative abnormal return averaging -1.2% over the three-day announcement 
window for a sample of 174 rights issues. However, for the sample of 84 placements, Denhert (1994) observes 
no significant negative abnormal returns over the five-day window surrounding the announcement date and 
some evidence of positive abnormal returns in the seven days leading up to the announcement. 
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H1b: Private placements are followed by a lower level of long-run underperformance than 
rights issues. 
3.2 The relation between long-run underperformance and offer date misvaluation 
As discussed previously, the long-run underperformance anomaly might stem from market 
misvaluation during the offer period. Penman (2000) proposes that in a less than perfectly 
efficient market, stock price can stray from fundamental (or ‘true’) value in the short-term but 
would be expected to move towards it in the longer term. Based on this mispricing view, if 
RIV is a more accurate reflection of the true asset value than stock price prior to the SEO 
announcement date, and if the costs of arbitrage are sufficiently large to prevent immediate 
convergence (Lee, Myers and Swaminathan, 1999), a positive correlation should be observed 
between an SEO firm’s RIV/P ratio and subsequent performance. We therefore hypothesise: 
H2: The pre-announcement RIV/P ratio of SEO firms is positively correlated with post-
announcement long-run underperformance. 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Data 
The SEO sample is sourced from the SDC Platinum database and includes SEOs made 
between 1993 and 2001 by Australian companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX).  We exclude issues relating to dividend re-investment plans, bonus plans, other non-
cash related share issues, and any by SEO firms that subsequently change their name or 
principal activity in the study period. To ensure completeness, the SDC sample was checked 
against a list of SEOs from Connect 4.7  Table 1 summarises the sampling procedure. 
 
                                                 
7 The SDC Platinum database for Australian SEOs starts in 1993 and the relevant Connect 4 database begins in 
1999.  
 11
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Share prices used to calculate returns are sourced from the CRIF sppr and SIRCA CRD 
databases.8 Accounting input variables are sourced from the Aspect/Huntley DatAnalysis 
database and analysts’ earnings forecasts are obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). Observations with missing announcement dates, information about SEO 
type (rights or placements), share prices, or accounting data were deleted following 
unsuccessful manual searches. Firms with negative book value of equity were also deleted 
from the main analysis.9   
Our final sample comprises 3,650 SEOs (664 rights issues and 2,986 private placements). 
Further analysis (not shown in tables) reveals the number of SEOs peaked in 1999 (593), 
reflecting an active issue period following soon after a low in 1998 (377). The modal number 
of SEOs made by any one firm during the sample period is one and the maximum 34. About 
half the SEOs were issued by resource firms (1,804), which include production as well as 
exploration companies. Other industrials constitute the second largest group (627), followed 
by technology (434), financial services (263), manufacturing (181) and utilities (35).  
4.2 Measuring long-run performance 
Following Ritter (1991) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), SEO firms’ returns are 
calculated for holding periods up to five years after the issue. Firms that were suspended or 
delisted are excluded from the relevant two-, three- or five-year return observations.10 Share 
prices are collected from the offer date until the earliest of the firm’s suspension or name 
                                                 
8 The CRIF share price-price relative (sppr) database is available from the Centre for Research in Finance at the 
Australian Graduate School of Management. The SIRCA Core Research Data (CRD) are available from the 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). 
9 These financially distressed firms were excluded to avoid biasing our findings in favour of underperformance, 
but subsequent analysis shows our main findings are not sensitive to their inclusion.  
10 If these events occur in the second year, the firm’s one-year return is calculated accordingly, but the two-year, 
three-year and five-year returns are assigned a return of –100% (see Ritter, 1991). As a robustness check, the 
sample was confined to surviving firms only, with similar results. 
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change date, the offering’s fifth anniversary, or 31 December 2002. Constraints on the 
availability of reliable daily share price data prevent their use as the primary source of 
returns. Instead, holding period returns for both issuers and the benchmark are calculated as 
the product of their monthly price relatives.  
Long-run performance is measured by computing the return from purchasing the shares at 
the closing price on the day before the SEO announcement date.11 Because CRIF provides 
monthly data, it is not possible to calculate the return over a period including the 
announcement date when it does not fall on the first trading day of the month. In such cases, 
SIRCA’s CRD is utilised to patch the CRIF monthly data to include the return from the 
beginning date to the last trading day of the announcement month. In the few cases where the 
SIRCA daily prices are not available for a particular SEO firm, the closing price of the month 
before the announcement month, obtained from CRIF, is used instead. Since the 2000 
Corporations Law reform, ASX listing rules allow a company to request a trading halt up to 
48 hours prior to announcing a share placement. Where this occurs, the last available price 
before the announcement date is used as the beginning price. 
As in prior studies, we use both raw returns and benchmark-adjusted (abnormal) returns to 
measure long-run performance. Abnormal return is computed two ways: (1) as the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative price relative on the stock and on its benchmark; and 
(2) as the difference between these two cumulative price relatives. Our main results are 
presented for the second measure.12 The ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index (XAO) as 
used by Allen and Soucik (1999a) is one possible benchmark. However, because XAO is 
value-weighted and less appropriate as a benchmark for small firms, we use a different 
‘market’ index, namely the average return for all firms covered by the CRIF monthly 
                                                 
11 Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) use the closing price on the day of the offering as the starting point for 
return calculations. We use the closing price the day before the announcement date due to Australian evidence 
that the announcement day return already reflects information relayed by the announcement (see Dehnert, 1992; 
1994). 
12 Untabulated results show the abnormal returns are qualitatively similar for the two measures. 
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database. This benchmark is more consistent with that used by Brav, Geczy and Gompers 
(2000) and Schultz (2003). Because CRIF provides only monthly values of its market index, 
we interpolate in part months by assuming the market benchmark return is earned evenly over 
the month.  
A market-wide benchmark suffers benchmark contamination because the SEO firms are 
themselves included in the benchmark (Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Ang and Zhang, 2002). 
The returns of matched firms’ securities could be used to overcome this bias. However, the 
Australian equity market has a relatively small number of listed companies with a large 
number of SEOs. As a result, the sample size drops substantially due to the difficulty in 
finding suitable matches when the matched-firm method is adopted. The outcome is lower 
statistical power and possible sample selection bias. Hence, although we also calculate results 
for a matched-firm benchmark, they are reported later in robustness tests. 
4.3 Calculating the RIV/P ratio 
RIV/P is the ratio of residual income value to share price. RIM expresses the intrinsic 
value of the firm’s equity as the current book value of equity plus the present value of an 
infinite series of expected residual incomes (Ohlson, 1995). In practical applications, we 
work with a finite series. Frankel and Lee (1998) show a naïve model that uses current 
earnings (assumed to be earned in perpetuity) performs as well as, or is superior to, models 
using three or more forecasting periods when explaining future stock prices.13 Models using 
analysts’ consensus forecasts perform marginally better, but few of our sample firms are on 
the I/B/E/S database and even fewer have an analyst following sufficient to generate reliable 
                                                 
13 Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) and Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) also show the model’s valuations 
are generally not sensitive to forecast horizons beyond three years. 
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consensus forecasts. Therefore to estimate RIV/P, we adopt the following naïve version of 
the model (i.e., with a two-period expansion and assuming no growth):14   
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Future return-on-equity (FROE) is calculated as net income divided by average book value 
(B). The firm’s required rate of return (r) is estimated according to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (Sharpe, 1964). The risk free rate is proxied by the 11 a.m. cash rate, which is the 
Australian equivalent of the US short-term treasury bill rate.15 The firm’s beta is sourced 
from CRIF and is the estimate for the quarter before the SEO’s announcement. If beta is 
unavailable (e.g., because the firm is a recent listing) then the average beta of all firms in the 
same industry is substituted. We assume a constant market risk premium of 6% per annum, 
which Officer (1994) estimates is the long-term premium in Australia. RIV is divided by the 
last available closing price before the announcement date, to obtain the RIV/P ratio.16 
For profitable firms, Frankel and Lee (1998) show RIV/P outperforms B/P in explaining 
future stock prices but they do not examine loss-making firms. As 71% of our SEO firms are 
loss firms (i.e., current period ROE is negative), the application of RIM is problematic. To 
address this concern, we assume residual income is zero for loss firms and for the small 
number of profit firms with negative residual income. As a consequence, the RIV/P ratio 
collapses to the book-to-price (B/P) ratio. This assumption is supported by Collins, Pincus 
and Xie (1999), who find negative earnings have little predictive ability while book value is a 
value-relevant proxy for future residual income (and for the abandonment option) for loss 
                                                 
14 The zero growth assumption is not unreasonable given our expectation of underperformance. See Curtis and 
Fargher (2003) who apply a similar model in an IPO context. 
15 Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) demonstrate the short-term t-bill rate is a better measure of the risk free 
rate than the long-term t-bond rate when used in RIV calculations. The Australian government no longer issues 
short-term treasury bills so the cash rate is used as a substitute. 
16 We report sensitivity tests of our RIM assumptions later in the paper.  
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firms.17 We also control for differences in the prior loss sequence across SEO firms because, 
as Joos and Plesko (2004) show, the market prices firms with transitory losses differently 
from those with persistent losses. 
 4.4 Hypothesis testing 
To test for evidence of underperformance (H1a), we test the significance of buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR) using a parametric one-sample t-test for BHAR means and a more 
robust, non-parametric sign test for BHAR medians. An independent sample t-test and a non-
parametric, Mann Whitney U test are utilised to test whether the BHAR of private placements 
and rights issues follow different return distributions (H1b). Two procedures are used to test 
for evidence of an association between the RIV/P and BHAR (H2).  The first involves 
dividing sample firms into RIV/P quintiles and comparing BHAR across quintiles. Mann 
Whitney U tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests are then used to test return differences 
between quintile 1 (lowest RIV/P) and quintile 5 (highest RIV/P). As a more powerful 
procedure, we estimate an OLS regression model to test the long-run performance 
explanatory power of RIV/P, after controlling for other potential determinants of long-run 
returns. The regression model is specified as follows: 
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In equation (2) α and ε are the constant and error terms respectively; BHAR is the firm’s long-
run abnormal performance; SEOTYPE has a value of one if the SEO is a rights issue and zero 
if it is a private placement (a negative coefficient is expected in accordance with H1b);  
LRIV/P is the natural logarithm of the RIV-to-price ratio as previously defined (a positive 
                                                 
17 Miller and Modigliani (1966) had earlier argued losses (negative earnings) are a poor proxy for the earning 
power of a firm’s assets.  
Formatted: Indent: First line: 
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coefficient is expected in accordance with H2); LOSS is an indicator variable for loss firms, 
equal to one if prior period net income is negative and zero if positive; and LOSS_SEQ is the 
number of sequential (net income) losses over the three years before the pre-announcement 
reporting period (i.e., t-1 to t-3). The remaining variables are control variables and are 
explained below.  
The variables DISCOUNT, LISSIZE and ISSUEVOL are included to control for differences 
across issues. DISCOUNT reflects the SEO’s discount (or premium) and is measured as the 
SEO offer price divided by the market price prevailing on the day before the SEO 
announcement. As in prior studies, it is expected to provide a strong signal of the extent of 
overvaluation.  LISSIZE is the natural logarithm of the ratio of SEO shares offered to ordinary 
shares outstanding pre-announcement and controls for the relative size of the offering.  
Bayless and Chaplinski (1996) find an offer of a larger percentage of total equity is a stronger 
negative signal.  ISSUEVOL is the total proceeds of all SEO issues in the same year in which 
the issue occurred and is included to control for ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ issue periods. Consistent 
with the windows of opportunity hypothesis, Bayless and Chaplinski (1996) report a delayed 
and more severe market reaction following hot (high-volume) issue markets. 
The variables AGE, LMCAP, CASH, LEVERAGE and BETA control for differences in 
firm-specific characteristics across SEO firms. AGE is the number of years from the firm’s 
listing date to the SEO announcement date. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) report post-
offering underperformance is usually more severe for younger, newly listed, firms. LMCAP 
proxies for firm size and is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalisation on the last trading day of the month prior to the announcement month. CASH is 
cash divided by total assets. Firms raising capital to fund cash flow deficits are less likely to 
be investing funds in long-term, value-creating projects. LEVERAGE is the firm’s ratio of 
total interest bearing debt to total assets. Bayless and Chaplinski (1996) show leverage 
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moderates the level of market reaction to SEO announcements. BETA is either the individual 
firm OLS beta, or if unavailable, the industry beta, calculated at the last quarter pre-
announcement and is included to control for a firm’s market-related risk. Allen and Soucik 
(1999b) find beta may partly explain long-run performance.  
The last two variables are included to control for industry differences. RESDUM is equal 
to one if the SEO firm is in a resources industry, defined as ASX primary industry 
classification codes 1 to 4, and zero otherwise. TECHDUM is equal to one if the firm is in a 
technology industry, defined as ASX primary industry code 18 (telecommunications) or code 
21 (healthcare and biotechnology), and zero otherwise. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
report differences in the post-offering performance of SEO firms across industries, and in our 
sample, the resources and the technology industries are two distinctly different and dominant 
industry groupings.18    
5. Results 
5.1 Sample characteristics and univariate tests of long-run performance 
Descriptive statistics for all firms in the SEO sample are presented in Table 2. Panel A 
shows the issue size is relatively small with a mean (median) 12.3% (6.8%) of issued capital, 
which when combined with the mean (median) discount of 4% (8.3%) implies SEOs have a 
limited dilution effect. The mean (median) age of an SEO firm is 9.9 (8) years, which implies 
the majority of SEO firms are not start-up companies. They are relatively small (median 
market capitalisation $10.8 million) and riskier than the market in general (median beta 
1.2).19  
[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
18 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of controls for the other minor industry groupings.  
19 The higher betas are not surprising given the dominance of resources and technology firms in the sample.  
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Further evident in Table 2, Panel A are the financial characteristics of SEO firms. 
Profitability is poor with a mean (median) ROA of -26.5% (-7.7%). Additionally, the large 
number of loss-making firms (71% of the sample made losses) and firms with persistent 
losses (median loss sequence is two for the full sample and three for the loss firm sub-
sample) suggest SEO firms are frequently financially stressed. SEO firms have limited 
borrowings (median debt is 3% of assets), which is not surprising given their poor 
profitability and low level of total assets (median $8.4m) to offer as security.  
The low median B/P ratio (0.54) implies the market expects future growth from most SEO 
firms.  In other words, the market seems to be optimistic that SEO firms will be able to 
overcome their current financial difficulties and achieve better results in the future. However, 
the low median RIV/P ratio (0.58) suggests this optimism is not reflected in fundamental 
value, as hypothesised in our overvaluation hypothesis (H2). 
Statistics presented in Table 2, Panel B provide strong support for H1a. A portfolio that 
consists of all SEO stocks earns a median raw return of -16.4% over the first year following 
the equity offering.20 The median raw returns are -30.5%, -34.2% and -47.8% when 
accumulated over two, three and five years following the equity issue, respectively. 
Consistent with the raw returns, both the mean and median long-run abnormal returns 
(BHAR) are negative and are magnified as the holding period lengthens. For example, in the 
first year following the equity offer, half the SEO firms underperform the CRIF market 
benchmark by at least 25.8% and by at least 51.6%, 68.6% and 112.4% over two, three and 
five years after the issue.21 The returns earned by Australian SEO stocks are much lower than 
those reported in US studies. For example, Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) sample of SEO 
firms has a mean raw return of 45.9% over the five years following the SEO issue. Various 
institutional factors (which we discuss later in the paper) may explain the difference. 
                                                 
20 Although we describe the return as following the offer, recall that it includes the return on announcement day. 
21 Using the continuously compounded returns method, SEO firms underperform the CRIF market portfolio by 
26%, 54%, 59% and 90% over 1, 2, 3 and 5 years following the SEO announcement.  
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In contrast to H1a, H1b is not supported. Table 2, Panel B shows the raw returns and 
BHAR characteristics separately for rights and placement firms. The latter generate 
8.3%,16.4%, 9.7%, and 6.7% lower median raw returns than rights issue firms over one, two, 
three and five years after the issue and this poor performance is reflected in benchmark 
adjusted (BHAR) returns. The return differences are statistically significant over all holding 
periods except the last (five-year) period.  
Characteristics of sub-samples reported in Table 2, Panel A reveal the lower (abnormal) 
return earned by placement firms does not seem to be driven by a small firm effect. The 
median differences show placement firms are similar in market capitalisation to rights 
issuers. However, they differ in most other characteristics. Placements are smaller issues,22 
offer lower discounts, and the larger ISSUEVOL shows they are made in more active markets. 
Furthermore, placement firms are less profitable, are more highly levered and tend to have 
higher levels of market-related risk.  A lower B/P ratio indicates market participants attach 
higher growth expectations to private placement firms. On the other hand, a low B/P ratio can 
indicate a stock is overpriced and this seems to be reflected in the lower median RIV/P ratio 
for placement firms. If this is the case, greater underperformance is expected of placement 
firms than of rights firms.  We investigate this issue later, when we consider how the RIV/P 
ratio is related to future performance. 
Although the signalling hypothesis and proprietary cost theory that underpin H1b are not 
supported, the results are not necessarily inconsistent with prior studies when institutional 
factors are considered. For example, Abhyankar and Ho (2003) find calendar-time, value-
weighted UK rights issue portfolios earn +110 basis points per month, while value-weighted 
share placement portfolios earn +75 basis points per month.  Australian rights issues tend to 
be larger than private placements, and are considered more costly and time-consuming 
                                                 
22 ASX listing rule 7.1 limits the percentage of securities that can be issued via a private placement without 
shareholder approval to 15% of total shares outstanding; it was 10% until November 1996. 
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(Dunn, 2003; ASX, 2004).23 As rights issues typically require 40 business days between the 
announcement or proposal date and the issue date, issuers must anticipate and incorporate any 
downwards price movement during that period into the pricing of the issue. A higher discount 
for rights issues helps ensure the issue is more fully subscribed. In contrast, a private 
placement that is less than 15% of issued capital requires no shareholder approval or 
prospectus and can be arranged at short notice (often within 48 hours) with a lower discount.  
Hence the size and urgency of the capital raising are important determinants of SEO type 
in Australia. A private placement is likely to be preferred when a firm wishes to raise a small 
amount of new funds quickly at minimal cost.  A rights issue is likely to be preferred when a 
firm wishes to raise a large amount of new funds without diluting existing equity interests 
because all current shareholders are entitled to subscribe to the new shares in proportion to 
their present holdings. In addition, the substantial fixed costs of a rights issue are more 
justifiable when the amount raised is large. 
5.2 Univariate tests of RIV/P’s predictive ability 
Our first test of H2 is conducted by comparing the abnormal return characteristics of 
quintile portfolios formed according to the RIV/P ratio. The results are presented in Table 3. 
In Panel A, RIV/P quintiles are ranked from the lowest (Q1) to the highest (Q5). A degree of 
market misvaluation, as captured by the RIV/P portfolios, is clearly evident. Mean and 
median one-year abnormal returns (BHAR1) increase monotonically down the portfolios and 
the two extreme quintiles are significantly different, with the means (medians) differing by 
44% (36%). This pattern is found for the two-, three- and five-year holding periods. 
 
[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
23 Most rights issues are underwritten whereas most placements are not. The underwriter’s fee is estimated to be 
between 2% and 3% for major capital raisings (Frith, 2003). 
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Table 3, Panel B shows similar results for the profit-firm sub-sample to those reported in 
Panel A for the full sample.  However, when the portfolios are sorted according to the B/P 
ratio (Panel C), the pattern is not as evident and the difference between the extreme portfolios 
is less significant. These results demonstrate the RIV/P ratio is a superior valuation measure 
to the B/P ratio for profitable firms. In contrast, for loss firms (where the RIV/P ratio 
collapses to the B/P ratio, following our assumption of zero future residual income), the B/P 
ratio performs as well as the RIV/P ratio does for profit firms. Panel D shows abnormal 
returns for the loss firms increase monotonically down the portfolios and the extreme quintile 
difference is significant across all holding periods. Thus these results provide support for H2; 
SEO firms with lower RIV/P (greater overvaluation) have significantly lower abnormal 
returns than their higher RIV/P counterparts. 
5.3 Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the regression analysis of factors expected to explain the level of abnormal 
return for one- two- three- and five-year holding periods. Contrary to H1b, the result for the 
one-year holding period shows a significantly positive SEOTYPE coefficient of 0.099 (t = 
2.44, p < 0.01). Similar results with varying levels of significance are observed across the 
other holding periods. Consistent with our earlier univariate findings, private placement 
issuers rather than rights issuers have lower abnormal returns after controlling for other SEO 
and firm-specific factors. In economic terms, the coefficients signify that, on average, private 
placement firms earn 10 to 20 cents (depending on the holding period) less than other firms 
for every dollar of return. Further analysis (not shown in tables) reveals larger and significant 
SEOTYPE coefficients for loss-making firms than for profitable firms, implying the lower 
long-run performance by placement firms is primarily driven by loss firms. 
[PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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Hypothesis 2 proposes a positive association between the RIV-to-price ratio and long-run 
abnormal return (i.e., more overvaluation leads to lower returns). As hypothesised, a 
significant positive LRIV/P coefficient of 0.08 (t = 6.98, p < 0.01) is observed in Table 4 for 
the one-year holding period and similar results are evident over longer holding periods. When 
the model is estimated for the issue type sub-samples, the results (not reported in tables) 
clearly show the more dominant role of placement issuers relative to rights issuers. The 
LRIV/P coefficients for placement firms are significant across all holding periods, whereas 
for rights firms, they are generally smaller and significant only in the one- and two-year 
holding periods. These findings reflect the greater overvaluation (lower average RIV/P ratio) 
of placement firms relative to rights firms reported in the univariate analysis. 
Further evident in Table 4 for the one-year holding period is the significantly negative 
LOSS coefficient of -0.154 (t = -3.54, p < 0.01). Firms with current period losses significantly 
underperform profitable firms. This result, which persists across all holding periods, 
highlights the importance of controlling for the direction of prior earnings performance in 
combination with valuation proxies when explaining long-run performance.24 Consistent with 
Collins et al. (1999), current earnings and book value appear to be important proxies for 
expected future abnormal earnings and returns for profit firms, whereas for loss firms, 
negative current period earnings are largely irrelevant and book value proxies for expected 
normal earnings (and the abandonment option).25  
Following Joos and Plesko (2004), LOSS_SEQ is included in the model to capture 
differences in the expected performance of loss firms based on the prior history of losses. 
                                                 
24 In sensitivity analysis we also include a slope dummy (LOSS multiplied by LRIV/P) in the model. A 
significant positive coefficient is observed in the one- and two-year but not the three- and five-year holding 
period regressions. All other results remain substantially the same.  
25 Recall that for loss firms, RIV/P equals B/P because we assume zero residual income. We test this assumption 
in sensitivity analysis by including current period net income (as recorded in the period prior to the SEO) 
deflated by total assets as a separated independent variable in our model for loss firms. The coefficient remains 
insignificant across all holdings period, confirming the irrelevance of current period earnings for predicting 
future performance.  
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Firms with persistent losses are more likely to continue to perform poorly relative to firms 
with more transitory losses. However, our findings show only weak support for this argument 
among SEO loss firms. The LOSS_SEQ coefficient is significantly negative only in the three-
year holding period (t = -2.27, p < 0.05) and is not significant over other holding periods.  
The SEO and firm-specific control variables included in the model have varying 
explanatory power. Among the SEO-related variables, DISCOUNT is the most dominant with 
significant positive coefficients across all holding periods, indicating, as expected, greater 
discounts are associated with lower returns. Also as expected, larger issuers experience 
greater underperformance as indicated by the negative LISSIZE coefficient for the two-year 
and longer holding periods. In contrast, the coefficient on the issue volume year variable 
(ISSUEVOL) is significantly negative only for two-year holding periods (t = -2.36, p < 0.01). 
Over other holding periods, the coefficient is insignificant or positive. Thus we find little 
evidence that abnormal returns are impacted by the nature of the prevailing market (i.e., hot 
or cold issue periods).26  Our study period is possibly too short to capture sufficient variation 
in market activity. 
Among the firm-specific control variables, the listing age (AGE) and firm size (LMCAP) 
variables exhibit persistent explanatory power. As in prior research  (e.g., Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1995), the significantly positive AGE coefficient for holding periods up to three years 
demonstrates more mature firms do not perform as poorly as younger firms subsequent to the 
issue. The significantly negative LMCAP coefficient across holding periods is consistent with 
Fama and French (1992). A negative relation is expected if larger firms tend to issue equity 
when internally generated funds are insufficient for short-term requirements. Smaller firms, if 
they manage to survive in the long-run, are more likely to generate extreme positive returns 
since they are riskier. Leverage is significant in explaining abnormal returns only for the one-
                                                 
26 In sensitivity tests we continue to find inconclusive results using alternative proxies for hot/cold issue years 
including: raw number of issues per year, ranked number of issues per year, ranked value of issues per year, and 
issue year dummy variables.  
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year holding period. Neither the level of cash holding prior to the issue (CASH) nor 
systematic risk (BETA) is significantly related to abnormal return. As others have found, beta 
is unrelated to abnormal return when size and B/P are included in the regression (Fama and 
French, 1992). Furthermore, beta is a noisier risk measure for SEO issuers, since most are 
small growth firms.  
Noticeable differences are evident in the results for the two dominant industry groups. 
Technology firms tend to outperform other SEO firms in earlier holding periods. In contrast, 
resource sector firms tend to underperform other SEO firms in later holding periods. 
Untabulated results reveal technology SEO firms are larger in size (as measured by market 
capitalisation), have larger cash holdings, better prior earnings performance and lower 
systematic risk than resource firms. Technology firms are therefore more likely to be using 
SEO proceeds to fund growth opportunities, while resource firms are more likely to be 
funding existing, less profitable projects.27  
Across all holdings periods, F-statistics show the independent variables jointly explain a 
significant amount of abnormal returns. Not surprisingly, the explanatory power of the 
model, which is typically low for this type of returns model, is greater for shorter holding 
periods (adjusted R-squares drop from 7.5% in the one- and two-year holding periods to 4.2% 
and 4.4% in the three-year and five-year holding periods).  
In summary, the multivariate results show consistent support for H1a and H2 but not H1b. 
The unexpected result for H1b implies institutional characteristics could be important, for 
several reasons. First, ASX listing rules allow funds to be raised within a relatively short 
period and on a more frequent basis via a private placement. Additionally, the abolition of a 
prospectus requirement for share placements makes them a low cost alternative for raising 
capital (Dunn, 2003); therefore they are more likely to be used by financially distressed firms 
                                                 
27 Estimating the regression model inclusive of additional dummy variables to cover other major industry groups 
produces results qualitatively similar to those reported with little evidence of other industry effects.   
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that need to raise capital quickly. Since they are likely to have poor operating performance, 
subsequent stock returns are likely to be lower than those for rights issues.28 Second, 
placements are typically for smaller dollar amounts than rights issues. Since the proceeds are 
smaller, placements often will be utilised to fund shorter-term objectives, such as reducing 
short-term borrowings, bridging temporary operating deficits, or acquiring short-lived assets. 
Rights issues, on the other hand, are more likely to be utilised to finance a major 
investment.29 Accordingly, rights issuers should perform better since they have superior 
growth potential. Third, in Australia most rights issues are underwritten by financial 
institutions, but most private placements are not. Underwriting is likely to signal higher 
quality and reduce the risk to less well-informed investors.30  
6. Robustness tests 
6.1 Offer frequency and survivorship  
Long-run performance measures may be sensitive to the treatment of multiple issuing 
firms and firms not surviving the holding periods tested. To assess the sensitivity of our 
results to the inclusion of multiple issuers, we re-estimate the regression model for the sub-
sample with only one issue over the five-year holding period, or with an issue number 
variable included as an additional model regressor using the full sample. Both approaches do 
not change our main findings. To address the survivorship issue, all tests are repeated for the 
sub-samples of  SEO firms that (1) survived to the end of each holding period, (2) survived to 
the beginning of each holding period, and (3) survived the full five-year study period. For all 
three sub-samples the results are consistent with those previously reported.   
                                                 
28 Obviously we are assuming the market is unaware of or unable to respond quickly to the overvaluations. 
29 Although the ASX requires firms to state the objective of a capital raising, it is not always possible to identify 
the various purposes for the new capital because firms often provide only general obscure statements.  
30 In our sample, 75% of rights issues and 22% of placements are underwritten. Untabulated results show the 
average long-run performance of underwritten SEOs is superior to non-underwritten SEOs.  
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6.2 Non-overlapping holding periods 
As our overlapping holding period approach to reporting returns tends to obscure each 
sub-period’s contribution to total return, we repeat our tests for each non-overlapping period. 
For firms that survived to the end of each respective period, the (untabulated) median one-, 
two-, three- and four to five-year abnormal returns continue to be significantly negative (-
26.2%, -27.4%, -20.3% and -41.8%, respectively).31 When the non-overlapping holding 
period returns are regressed on the valuation and other control variables (as per equation 2) a 
noticeable decline in the model’s explanatory power is evident. As shown in Table 5, most of 
the explanatory power of the valuation proxies (LRIV/P and LOSS) and issue-specific 
variables is confined to the first two years immediately after the issue.   
[PLACE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
6.3 Abnormal return measurement method 
A characteristics-matched firm is often claimed to offer a better benchmark than a market 
index (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Ang and Zhang, 2002). To test the robustness of our results to 
the application of such a benchmark, we first identifying all non-SEO firms within ±30% of 
the market value of the event firm and within the same industry. Then, the firm with a B/P 
ratio closest to that of the event firm is selected as the benchmark.  
The matching procedure leads to a substantial reduction (of approximately 44%) in the 
number of observations due the unavailability of many suitable matches. Further analysis 
shows the deleted, unmatched SEO sub-sample is significantly larger in pre-announcement 
date market capitalisation and cash holdings, and has significantly smaller B/P and  RIV/P 
ratios (i.e., greater overvaluation) than the matched sub-sample.  Despite this sample 
                                                 
31 Year one excludes the announcement month return.  
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selection bias, the matched SEO sub-sample still exhibits long-run underperformance.32 For 
example, the median one-, two-, three- and four to five-year abnormal returns are -12.1%, -
20.7%, -27.1%, -11.4%, respectively and all are significant at the 5% level. Thus H1a is 
robust to this alternative abnormal return benchmark. Untabulated results confirm that our 
prior findings for H1b and H2 are also robust to the use of this alternative benchmark.   
6.4 Residual income model (RIM) assumptions 
Although the residual income model is less sensitive to variation in assumptions than 
alternative valuation models, errors in input measures can nevertheless reduce its accuracy 
(Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001). To demonstrate the robustness of the RIM approach, we re-
estimate the regression model using RIV/P calculated according to alternative inputs. First, 
each firm’s required rate of return is re-computed using a 4%, 5% or 7% market risk 
premium. Second, we use a simple naïve one-period expansion model where current earnings 
are assumed to be the best predictor of future earnings.33 Third, two alternative earnings 
metrics are used to estimate the future ROE: net operating profit after abnormal items (net of 
income tax), and median analysts’ consensus forecasts, provided by I/B/E/S. Finally, the B/P 
ratio is used instead of the RIV/P ratio as an alternative valuation measure. That is, we 
assume all SEO firms (both profit and loss) have zero future residual income.  
Apart from the B/P and analysts’ forecast-based regressions, the results from each set of 
tests are similar to those we have reported in detail. In the B/P regressions, the B/P coefficient 
is noticeably smaller and less significant than in the main results for RIV/P, and is 
insignificant in the five-year holding period results. These findings are consistent with those 
                                                 
32 A possible counteracting bias is introduced through matching on pre-announcement B/P. As our earlier results 
show, misvaluation is likely to lead to inflated B/P ratios for many of our SEO firms.  Assuming the matched 
(non-SEO) firm B/P ratios are correct, the matching procedure will introduce a benchmark bias in favour of 
finding long-run underperformance. 
33 This is equivalent to model 1 in Frankel and Lee (1998). 
 28
shown in Table 4 and those of Dong et al. (2003), who report the RIV/P ratio has incremental 
explanatory power over the B/P ratio.  
When RIV/P is measured using analysts’ forecasts, we find the variable is no longer 
positively related to long-run abnormal return and it is negative in some versions of the 
model. We also re-estimated the main regression model inclusive of a dummy variable for 
I/B/E/S-covered firms. The related coefficient is insignificant in all our tests which further 
suggests that analyst-covered firms are not significantly different in explaining abnormal 
return. The reduced power of the model resulting from a much smaller sample size (less than 
10% of our sample firms have I/B/E/S coverage) is a possible explanation. Analysts’ earnings 
forecasts may also be overly optimistic prior to the SEO, which would add noise to our 
RIV/P measure.  However, in a related paper, Brown and Wong (2005) find no evidence of 
pre-SEO announcement date bias after controlling for factors known to be associated with 
bias in analyst forecasts.  We therefore leave resolution of this issue to further research.  
7. Discussion and conclusion 
Overall, empirical support is found for the primary hypotheses (1a and 2) but not for 
Hypothesis 1b. In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, both univariate and multivariate tests 
confirm the existence of a long-run underperformance anomaly following Australian 
seasoned equity offerings. These results are consistent with most prior US and non-US 
research. Additionally, the larger magnitude of underperformance reported here, relative to 
US studies, is likely to be due to the dominance of small, loss-making firms in our sample. 
Although we do not attempt to distinguish between explanations for long-run 
underperformance, our results are consistent with the windows of opportunity hypothesis, 
whereby managers take advantage of temporary overvaluation in their firm’s stock to issue 
equity. 
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With respect to Hypothesis 1b, contrary to expectations, firms making private placements 
exhibit larger, negative abnormal returns than firms making rights issues. The Australian 
institutional environment, in particular the costly nature of rights issues, means larger, more 
profitable firms are more likely to use this method to raise capital. Thus in the case of 
Australian SEOs, a self-selection rationale appears to dominate explanations based on the 
proprietary cost or signalling theories that would otherwise suggest less misvaluation and 
superior performance by placement issuers rather than rights issuers.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, more overvalued (undervalued) SEO firms perform worse 
(better) than their benchmark in the post-issue period. Our study is the first known study to 
document such a link between SEO misvaluation (using a residual income-based valuation 
model) and SEO long-run underperformance. The Australian evidence also supports similar 
findings in other contexts (Frankel and Lee, 1998; D’Mello and Shroff, 2000; Ali et al., 2003; 
Dong et al., 2003). That is, RIV/P has explanatory power in predicting future abnormal stock 
returns. That said, we should also acknowledge the predictive power of RIV/P declines 
rapidly after the first two years following the SEO announcement, and is mainly confined to 
loss firms and placement firms over holdings periods beyond two years. Even where the 
market apparently misvalues SEO firms, it would be difficult for a would-be arbitrageur to 
‘get set’ because most of them are small and thinly traded.  
Our results are robust to alternative methods and assumptions used to measure returns and 
fundamental value, and to different sub-periods and issuer characteristics. Our misvaluation 
findings highlight an important implication for researchers using a matched-firm benchmark 
in SEO long-run performance studies; matching on characteristics correlated with residual 
income value, such as the book-to-price ratio, may inadvertently introduce matching or 
sample selection bias leading to spurious inferences about long-run performance. Further, our 
findings demonstrate the importance of researching SEO performance in alternative 
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institutional settings. Finally, we offer several insights into the behaviour of the Australian 
SEO market that could interest investors. 
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Table 1 
Sample selection procedure  
Selecting Criterion Number of Cases 
Number of Australian SEOs from the SDC Platinum Database, 1993-2001, 
after excluding non-SEO issues or SEO firms changing names or principal 
activities 4,636 
Less: SEOs by trusts, including real estate investment trusts   (87) 
SEOs with missing announcement dates (257) 
SEOs where the rights or placement status cannot be clearly established    (4) 
Observations with missing share prices (in CRIF share price database) (343) 
Observations with missing financial information (in the Aspect/Huntley  
DatAnalysis database) (210) 
Observations with negative book value of equity   (81) 
Observations with RIV/P outliers    (4) 
Final Sample 3,650 
Rights Issues   664 
Private Placements 2,986 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of SEOs issued during 1993-2001 and univariate tests of long-run abnormal return calculated using 
the CRIF market index  benchmark 
 All SEOs  Rights Issues  Private Placements 
Median 
Difference 
Variable N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  
Panel A: Issue-specific and firm-specific characteristics 
ISSUE SIZE 3650 0.123 0.068  664 0.221 0.158  2986 0.101 0.059  0.099** 
DISCOUNT 3650 0.960 0.917  664 0.853 0.833  2986 0.984 0.931 -0.097** 
ISSUEVOL ($m) 3650 3675.1 3250.6  664 3545.9 3250.6  2986 3703.8 3344.9 -94.30** 
AGE 3650 9.9 8.0  664 11.1 8.0  2986 9.7 8.0   0.000 
MCAP ($m) 3650 195.5 10.8  664 119.0 10.7  2986 212.5 10.9  -0.200 
ASSETS ($m) 3650 617.6 8.4  664 256.7 11.3  2986 697.9 8.2  3.113** 
CASH_A 3650 0.164 0.085  664 0.149 0.068  2986 0.167 0.089 -0.021** 
ROA 3650 -0.265 -0.077  664 -0.272 -0.051  2986 -0.264 -0.082 0.032** 
ROA>0 (Profit) 1072 0.087 0.063  242 0.074 0.061  830 0.091 0.064 -0.004 
ROA<0 (Loss) 2578 -0.412 -0.149  422 -0.470 -0.146  2156 -0.401 -0.151 0.005 
LOSS_SEQ 3650 1.676 2.000  664 1.508 1.000  2986 1.713 2.000 -1.000** 
LEVERAGE 3650 0.153 0.031  664 0.173 0.056  2986 0.149 0.027 0.028** 
BETA 3650 1.281 1.200  664 1.153 1.090  2986 1.310 1.212 -0.122** 
B/P 3650 0.808 0.541  664 0.938 0.643  2986 0.779 0.518 0.124** 
RIV/P 3650 1.398 0.578  664 1.652 0.749  2986 1.342 0.550 0.199** 
Panel B: Return Characteristics 
Raw return 1 year 3650 0.044 -0.164  664 0.132 -0.099  2986 0.024 -0.182 0.083** 
Raw return 2 year 3163 0.005 -0.305  577 0.170 -0.174  2586 -0.031 -0.338 0.164** 
Raw return 3 year 2600 0.075 -0.342  500 0.185 -0.269  2100 0.049 -0.365 0.097* 
Raw return 5 year 1606 0.043 -0.478  311 0.133 -0.420  1295 0.021 -0.487 0.067 
BHAR1 3650 -0.052 -0.258  664 0.029 -0.178  2986 -0.071 -0.274 0.097** 
N<0  (p-value) 2435 (<0.001) (<0.001)  419 0.453 (<0.001)  2016 (<0.001) (<0.001)  
BHAR2 3163 -0.207 -0.516  577 -0.045 -0.388  2586 -0.243 -0.544 0.156** 
N<0  (p-value) 2327 (<0.001) (<0.001)  378 (0.425) (<0.001)  1949 (<0.001) (<0.001)  
BHAR3 2600 -0.274 -0.686  500 -0.177 -0.608  2100 -0.297 -0.696 0.088* 
N<0  (p-value) 1999 (<0.001) (<0.001)  368 (0.019) (<0.001)  1631 (<0.001) (<0.001)  
BHAR5 1606 -0.638 -1.124  311 -0.533 -1.069  1295 -0.663 -1.134 0.065 
N<0  (p-value) 1353 (<0.001) (<0.001)  257 (<0.001) (<0.001)  1096 (<0.001) (<0.001)  
*, ** characteristics are significantly different at the 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (Mann-Whitney U test). P-values in parenthesis 
are the probabilities that the return measure differs from zero based on t-statistics for means and sign-tests for medians; ISSUE SIZE is 
the ratio of  SEO shares offered to ordinary shares outstanding pre-announcement DISCOUNT is the SEO offer price divided by the 
market price prevailing on the day before the announcement date; ISSUEVOL is the total capital raised via SEOs by all firms in the 
sample during the year of the SEO; AGE is years since listing; MCAP is the pre-announcement market capitalisation; ASSETS is pre-
announcement total assets; CASH is pre-announcement cash divided by ASSETS; ROA is pre-announcement net income (before 
abnormal items net of tax) divided by ASSETS; LOSS_SEQ is the number of sequential (net income) losses over the three years before 
the pre-announcement reporting period (i.e. t-1 to t-3); LEVERAGE is pre-announcement total interest bearing debt divided by 
ASSETS; BETA is either the individual firm OLS beta or the industry beta calculated at the last quarter pre-announcement; B/P (book-
to-price ratio) is pre-announcement book value of equity to market capitalisation ratio; RIV/P is pre-announcement residual income 
value to price ratio; Raw return is the buy-and-hold return from investing in an SEO firm for the indicated period; BHAR is the 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference in buy-and-hold return on the SEO firm and the CRIF market portfolio, (1-5 indicates the 
holding period in years subsequent to SEO announcement date). 
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Table 3 
Mean and median return characteristics of RIV/P and B/P quintile portfolios of firms issuing SEOs 
between 1993 and 2001 
 BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 BHAR5 
Quintile Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A:  All SEOs – RIV/P portfolios (from lowest to highest quintile)  
Q1 -0.280 -0.469 -0.463 -0.749 -0.455 -0.833 -0.863 -1.257 
Q2 -0.135 -0.328 -0.385 -0.624 -0.509 -0.821 -1.019 -1.224 
Q3 -0.080 -0.253 -0.289 -0.527 -0.310 -0.674 -0.781 -1.197 
Q4 0.070 -0.146 0.007 -0.359 -0.155 -0.542 -0.382 -0.956 
Q5 0.164 -0.110 0.122 -0.189 0.038 -0.489 -0.008 -0.831 
Q5-Q1 0.443** 0.359** 0.584** 0.561** 0.492** 0.344** 0.854** 0.426** 
        
Panel B:  Profit Firms – RIV/P portfolios (from lowest to highest quintile) 
Q1  -0.235 -0.365 -0.379 -0.689 -0.467 -0.852 -0.867 -1.284 
Q2 -0.034 -0.131 -0.269 -0.350 -0.402 -0.577 -0.454 -1.027 
Q3 0.004 -0.105 0.022 -0.173 -0.212 -0.239 -0.290 -0.818 
Q4  -0.028 -0.057 -0.056 -0.183 0.059 -0.353 0.287 -0.630 
Q5 0.066 -0.125 0.105 -0.334 0.144 -0.336 -0.074 -0.780 
Q5-Q1 0.300** 0.240** 0.485** 0.356** 0.611** 0.516** 0.793** 0.504* 
         
Panel C:  Profit Firms - Book-to-market (B/P) portfolios (from lowest to highest quintile) 
Q1 -0.062 -0.245 -0.219 -0.615 -0.073 -0.780 0.533 -0.857 
Q2 -0.072 -0.083 0.012 -0.318 -0.177 -0.430 -0.357 -0.878 
Q3 -0.060 -0.109 -0.214 -0.359 -0.308 -0.490 -0.550 -0.896 
Q4 -0.074 -0.134 -0.081 -0.186 -0.139 -0.340 -0.193 -1.004 
Q5 0.041 -0.169 -0.076 -0.408 -0.124 -0.537 -0.492 -1.027 
Q5-Q1 0.103 0.076* 0.144 0.207* -0.051 0.243 -1.025 -0.170 
         
Panel D:  Loss Firms – RIV/P portfolios (from lowest to highest quintile) 
Q1 -0.295 -0.493 -0.551 -0.774 -0.539 -0.852 -0.961 -1.256 
Q2 -0.160 -0.373 -0.376 -0.649 -0.464 -0.786 -1.054 -1.221 
Q3 -0.120 -0.315 -0.335 -0.617 -0.403 -0.743 -0.940 -1.293 
Q4 0.051 -0.229 -0.100 -0.521 -0.242 -0.716 -0.625 -1.104 
Q5 0.259 -0.108 0.185 -0.166 0.017 -0.595 -0.209 -0.928 
Q5-Q1 0.554** 0.385** 0.737** 0.608** 0.556** 0.256** 0.752** 0.329** 
*, ** characteristics of quintile 1 and quintile 5 portfolios are significantly different at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels based 
on t-statistics for means and Mann-Whitney U tests shown under medians (two tailed tests).  B/P (book-to-price ratio) 
is pre-announcement book value of equity to market capitalisation ratio; RIV/P is pre-announcement residual income 
value to price ratio; BHAR is the abnormal return, calculated as the difference in buy-and-hold return on the SEO 
firm and the CRIF market portfolio, (1-5 indicates the holding period in years subsequent to SEO announcement 
date). 
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Table 4 
Regression analysis of valuation and other factors explaining post-announcement abnormal returns over 
one- two- three- and five-year holding periods for firms making SEOs between 1993 and 2001 
  Holding Periods 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign One-year Two-year Three-year  Five-year  
Intercept  1.398 1.989 0.846 0.625 
  (7.24)** (7.10)** (2.02)* (0.98) 
SEOTYPE - 0.099 0.199 0.195 0.179 
  (2.44)** (3.46)** (2.30)* (1.41)^ 
LRIV/P + 0.080 0.112 0.111 0.151 
  (6.98)** (6.97)** (4.67)** (4.13)** 
LOSS - -0.154 -0.299 -0.149 -0.381 
  (-3.54)** (-4.82)** (-1.60)^ (-2.76)** 
LOSS_SEQ - 0.011 0.004 -0.066 -0.024 
  (0.77) (0.18) (-2.27)* (-0.57) 
DISCOUNT + 0.312 0.346 0.382 0.269 
  (8.03)** (6.16)** (4.66)** (2.19)* 
LISSIZE - -0.008 -0.034 -0.054 -0.067 
  (-0.70) (-2.01)* (-2.17)* (-1.82)* 
ISSUEVOL - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.55) (-2.36)** (4.96)** (-0.6) 
AGE + 0.008 0.007 0.007 -0.005 
  (4.76)** (3.29)** (1.95)* (-0.98) 
LMCAP - -0.104 -0.138 -0.117 -0.058 
  (-9.77)** (-9.02)** (-5.03)** (-1.61)^ 
CASH + -0.046 -0.011 0.133 0.275 
  (-0.61) (-0.10) (0.82) (1.16) 
LEVERAGE + 0.173 0.114 0.075 -0.093 
  (2.3)* (1.07) (0.46) (-0.38) 
BETA + 0.003 0.007 0.016 0.006 
  (0.27) (0.48) (0.76) (0.21) 
RES_DUM ? -0.015 -0.063 -0.148 -0.428 
  (-0.44) (-1.26) (-1.97)* (-3.77)** 
TECH_DUM ? 0.116 0.226 0.084 -0.028 
  (2.34)* (3.17)** (0.76) (-0.17) 
Adj. R2  0.075 0.075 0.042 0.044 
F-statistic  (22.21)** (19.32)** (9.18)** (6.32)** 
N  3650 3163 2600 1606 
^, *, ** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed 
when coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively. Abnormal return (BHAR) is calculated by subtracting the 
CRIF benchmark return from the SEO firm’s buy-and hold return for the respective period. SEOTYPE is equal to 1 
for a rights issue or 0 for a private placement; LRIV/P is the pre-announcement natural log of the residual income 
value to price ratio; LOSS is equal to 1 if pre-announcement net income is negative and 0 if positive; LOSS_SEQ is 
the number of sequential (net income) losses over the three years before the pre-announcement reporting period 
(i.e. t-1 to t-3); LISSIZE is the natural log of the ratio of  SEO shares offered to ordinary shares outstanding pre-
announcement; DISCOUNT is the SEO offer price divided by the market price prevailing on the day before the 
announcement date;  ISSUEVOL is the total capital raised via SEOs by all firms in the sample during the year of 
the SEO; AGE is years since listing; LMCAP is the natural log of pre-announcement market capitalisation; CASH 
is pre-announcement cash divided by total assets; LEVERAGE is pre-announcement total interest bearing debt 
divided by total assets; BETA is either the individual firm OLS beta or the industry beta calculated at the last 
quarter pre-announcement; RES_DUM is equal to 1 if the firm is in the resources industries and 0 otherwise; 
TECH_DUM is equal to 1 if the firm in the technology industries and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Regression analysis of valuation and other factors explaining post-announcement abnormal returns (BHAR) 
for firms making SEOs between 1993 and 2001 for each non-overlapping holding period. 
  Holding Period 
Explanatory Variable Predicted Sign Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Years 4-5 
Intercept  1.434 1.170 0.006 -10.563 
  (7.61)** (4.00)** (0.01) (-1.83)* 
SEOTYPE - 0.156 0.122 -0.067 -0.047 
  (3.94)** (2.03)* (-0.54) (-0.04) 
LRIV/P + 0.072 0.042 0.052 0.180 
  (6.43)** (2.47)** (1.47)^ (0.54) 
LOSS - -0.161 -0.096 0.123 1.401 
  (-3.76)** (-1.49)^ (0.89) (1.13) 
LOSS_SEQ - 0.009 -0.018 -0.029 -0.050 
  (0.66) (-0.89) (-0.68) (-0.13) 
DISCOUNT + 0.109 0.006 0.053 6.762 
  (2.85)** (0.11) (0.45) (6.16)** 
LISSIZE - -0.025 -0.042 -0.056 0.374 
  (-2.07)* (-2.4)** (-1.53)^ (1.12) 
ISSUEVOL - 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  (-0.29) (-0.82) (7.01)** (-2.64)** 
AGE + 0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.037 
  (4.83)** (0.83) (1.04) (-0.79) 
LMCAP - -0.099 -0.071 -0.067 0.577 
  (-9.58)** (-4.42)** (-1.94)* (1.76)* 
CASH_A + -0.061 0.038 0.277 4.246 
  (-0.83) (0.35) (1.17) (2.00)* 
LEVERAGE + 0.244 -0.045 -0.098 -1.730 
  (3.31)** (-0.4) (-0.41) (-0.76) 
BETA + 0.007 -0.002 0.031 0.037 
  (0.62) (-0.13) (1.00) (0.15) 
RES_DUM ? 0.002 -0.023 -0.136 -2.308 
  (0.04) (-0.44) (-1.23) (-2.25)* 
TECH_DUM ? 0.131 0.213 0.005 -2.036 
  (2.68)** (2.85)** (0.03) (-1.32) 
Adj. R2  0.057 0.011 0.020 0.027 
F-statistic  (16.56)** (3.44)** (4.59)** (4.07)** 
N  3574 3072 2524 1549 
^, *, ** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed when 
coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively. Abnormal return (BHAR) is calculated by subtracting the CRIF benchmark 
return from the SEO firm’s buy-and hold return for each holding period (1, 2, 3 and 4-5 years) after the announcement 
month. SEOTYPE is equal to 1 for a rights issue or 0 for a private placement; LRIV/P is the pre-announcement natural log 
of the residual income value to price ratio; LOSS is equal to 1 if pre-announcement net income is negative and 0 if 
positive; LOSS_SEQ is the number of sequential (net income) losses over the three years before the pre-announcement 
reporting period (i.e. t-1 to t-3); LISSIZE is the natural log of the ratio of SEO shares offered to ordinary shares 
outstanding pre-announcement; DISCOUNT is the SEO offer price divided by the market price prevailing on the day 
before the announcement date; ISSUEVOL is the total capital raised via SEOs by all firms in the sample during the year 
of the SEO; AGE is years since listing; LMCAP is the natural log of pre-announcement market capitalisation; CASH is 
pre-announcement cash divided by total assets; LEVERAGE is pre-announcement total interest bearing debt divided by 
total assets; BETA is either the individual firm OLS beta or the industry beta calculated at the last quarter pre-
announcement; RES_DUM is equal to 1 if the firm is in the resources industries and 0 otherwise; TECH_DUM is equal to 
1 if the firm in the technology industries and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
